7/15/2013 @ 8:00AM
60 Years After The Korean War, The U.S. Must End Its Cold War Alliance With South Korea
略
President Barack Obama has said less, but American policy remains largely unchanged. The U.S. maintains a defense guarantee with and nearly 30,000 troops in the ROK, has been tightening its alliance with Seoul, sent B-52s and B-2s to overfly the peninsula earlier this year, and conducts annual exercises with the ROK military.
This policy is not in America’s interest. Washington should disengage from the peninsula. That requires turning security for the South over to Seoul. Normalizing relations with North Korea while handing the nuclear issue to its neighbors. And leaving the two Koreas free to decide their future relationship.
First, the U.S. should end its Cold War alliance with South Korea. Six decades ago the Korean War ended. That conflict spawned the “mutual defense” treaty with Seoul, a one-way security guarantee backed by forces stationed in the ROK. Although the American garrison has diminished in size and the South talks of taking on increased security responsibilities, the alliance remains antiquated and one-sided.
Washington’s defense promise obviously benefits the ROK, but makes no sense for America. The Korean peninsula no longer is tied to a global military struggle, as during the Cold War. The likelihood of the DPRK’s Cold War allies, Beijing and Moscow, offering military support to the North in a rerun of the Korean War is vanishingly small. Finally, the South enjoys huge economic and other advantages over North Korea and is capable of defending itself.
Washington should end joint military exercises, give notice of its intention to terminate the security pact, and begin planning the withdrawal of U.S. military forces. The two governments then could negotiate, as equals, terms for future military cooperation. The focus would not be the DPRK, which would be Seoul’s responsibility, but broader regional and global activities in both nations’ interest.
Second, American officials should set aside the nuclear issue in order to engage Pyongyang. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions most directly affect its neighbors. The North lacks any means to attack the U.S.—other than targeting troops which should be brought home from South Korea. Even if the DPRK could act, confronting America would be suicidal, a quality not evident in Pyongyang. Washington should make the one genuine threat, nuclear transfers to non-state actors, a red line. Otherwise the U.S. should turn over the issue to the countries with the most at stake: China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia.
Then the U.S. should indicate its willingness to sign a peace treaty and open diplomatic relations. These long have been North Korean priorities: the North’s ambassador in Geneva, Sin Son-ho, recently held an unprecedented press conference denouncing the U.S. for “the hostile relations between the DPRK and the United States, which can lead to another war at any moment.”
Set aside his reflexive blame of America. Six decades surely is long enough to officially end the Korean War. Moreover, the U.S. government would benefit from a small window into DPRK society, direct process to handle mundane diplomatic matters, and official channel for more serious communication.
Third, American policymakers should make clear that it is up to the two Koreas to work out the peninsula’s future. If the U.S. no longer was responsible for defending the South, it would have no reason to object to ROK initiatives such as the Sunshine Policy which subsidized the North. The future of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the subject of ongoing inter-Korean negotiations, similarly criticized for benefiting Pyongyang, also would become a matter of indifference to Washington.
Reunification—whether and, if so, in what form?—would be entirely up to the Korean people. The U.S. would retain strong ties to even a reunited Korea given the abundant commercial and extensive family ties across the Pacific. However, Washington would not presume to dictate the ultimate inter-Korean relationship, which needs to evolve along with events on the peninsula. Most important, the U.S. would not attempt to turn the peninsula into a base for use to contain Beijing.
A more relaxed American approach offers numerous advantages. Leaving the ROK responsible for its own defense would reduce U.S. outlays by cutting America’s troop requirements. Doing so also would make the South fully accountable for the consequences of its policies.
Eliminating Washington’s military presence in South Korea and improving its relationship with the DPRK would take America out of the region’s line of fire. There’s no reason for the U.S. to be entangled in Korean disputes with minimal impact on America. Although the North currently lacks the ability to challenge the U.S., the former believes Washington’s policies require doing so.
Moreover, if anyone can convince the North to abandon nuclear weapons, it will be its neighbors. This includes China, which would recognize that Seoul and Tokyo might develop their own nuclear weapons if America no longer maintained a “nuclear umbrella.” Instead of expecting Washington to produce a miracle solution, other nations would be forced consider new strategies to address the DPRK.
Simultaneously stepping back militarily and advancing diplomatically would diminish the North’s rationale for both its nuclear program and advanced conventional deployments, opening the way for possible reform. Yonsei University’s John Delury recently suggested that “North Korea today resembles China in 1970: waiting for a security guarantee from Washington before embarking on real economic reform.”
Of course, Mao Zedong, not Richard Nixon, was the biggest obstacle to change then. Pyongyang’s complaints might be propaganda boilerplate and the government’s belligerent policy might continue unchanged. The Korea Economic Institute’s Nicholas Hamisevicz complained that Pyongyang’s behavior made “it extremely difficult for countries such as the United States, South Korea, and Japan to engage North Korea and begin moving toward a more positive environment.”
However, the DPRK long has criticized the combined military exercises, which don’t look as harmless from the North. Moreover, the U.S. claims the right to attack any nation at any time for any reason, and North Korea clearly is on America’s “list.” Pyongyang has reason to worry that the allies might attempt regime change if they believed they had a favorable opportunity to do so, as in Libya.
Amb. Sin said that dissolution of what formally remains the United Nations Command could be followed by “confidence-building measures.” Last week Japan’s TV Asahi reported that the Kim regime intends to demobilize 300,000 soldiers. Only the prospect of sustained peaceful engagement with America offers any chance, however small, of turning such possibilities into reality.
In any case, current policy is broken. Is there a genuine desire to reduce tensions hidden within the North’s endless bombast? There’s no way to tell without challenging Pyongyang by accepting its latest proposal for talks.
So long as North Korea is devoted to producing more nuclear weapons, it will not look or act like a “normal country.” Nor will it be easy for the U.S. and DPRK to put aside fundamental differences, such as on human rights. But that doesn’t mean the two governments cannot have a peaceful relationship.
Both sides would benefit from reducing the possibility of conflict. That’s a good starting point for any negotiation.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2013/07/15/60-years-after-the-korean-war-the-u-s-must-end-its-cold-war-alliance-with-south-korea/2/
で韓国といふお荷物が消えて、米国にとって日米同盟の重要性が更に揺るがないものになるわけですよ。
、、、(w
8 件のコメント:
なんでか知りませんがこの英文をオイラのクロームちゃんが必死に自動翻訳したがってますう
自称国立大学卒の知恵遅れ君に訳してもらったらええんちゃうんか?w
US, South Korea to form combined division next year
September 4, 2014
http://www.stripes.com/news/us-south-korea-to-form-combined-division-next-year-1.301443
South Korea rules out residual US force near DMZ after consolidation
September 5, 2014
http://www.stripes.com/news/south-korea-rules-out-residual-us-force-near-dmz-after-consolidation-1.301613
http://www.stripes.com/news/former-usfk-chief-criticizes-us-pressure-on-seoul-to-accept-thaad-system-1.307646
2014.10.22 11:00
韓国空軍の中国エアショー参加、「軍事技術が漏れる」と米国が“待った”
韓国空軍のエリート部隊である曲技飛行チーム「ブラックイーグルス」が11月中旬に中国で開催されるエアショーに参加しようとしたところ、米国から「待った」がかかった。ショーに参加する空軍機が米国の技術で製造されており、米国としては中国への軍事技術漏洩を恐れるからだ。韓国にとってエアショー参加は「反日」で共闘する中国との軍事協力強化に加え、空軍機売り込みの狙いもある。韓国内では「デモンストレーション飛行なのに米国は神経質すぎる」との声もあり、どうしても参加したいようだが、米側はこうした“無神経さ”に強い不快感を示しているとされる。(岡田敏彦)
「韓国=諜報脅威国」として米国から名指し
エアショー参加で米国が中国への軍事技術漏洩を危ぐするのも当然だ。朝鮮日報(電子版)は「今回は武器輸出ではなくデモンストレーション飛行であるため、米国の反応は神経質すぎる」という韓国内の声を紹介したが、米国はこんな主張に全く耳をかさない。
米紙ニューヨーク・タイムズ(電子版)は昨年末、米中央情報局(CIA)の元職員、スノーデン容疑者から入手したとする「電子傍受」に関する内部文書を掲載。それにより米国が軍事、科学技術、情報分野で諜報活動を行う最大の脅威国として、中国、ロシア、キューバ、北朝鮮などとともに韓国を名指ししていたことが明らかになった。
実際、戦車の射撃統制装置や対艦ミサイル「ヘソン」の技術、戦闘機F-15Kの暗視装置、イージス艦のレーダーシステムなど、韓国のパクリ・技術盗用疑惑は限りない。そしてエアショー参加は技術を横流しする格好の舞台にもなり得る。
売る気満々
エアショーに出る今一つの理由は、T50の売り込みだともいわれる。T50は練習機だが、小改造で軽攻撃機「FA50」となるよう設計されており、韓国では輸出しようと躍起。米国と友好関係にあるインドネシアやフィリピンに少数の輸出は決まったものの、大規模導入を決める国は現れていない。
そもそも珠海エアショーは「中国国際航空航天博覧会」の正式名称通り、各国の航空・宇宙産業の関連企業約650社が出展し、各社が軍関係者に売り込みを図る場でもある。ただし出展企業に米国と欧州の企業はなく、中国、ロシアとその衛星国にとどまっている。そんなところへ「自国産」と称して米国技術の機体を売り込みに行く姿勢が、米国にとっては認めがたいことなのだ。
http://www.sankei.com/west/print/141016/wst1410160063-c.html
www.archives.gov/education/lessons/korean-conflict/
Japan has deepened its strategic relations with Australia and India. We are enhancing our cooperation across many fields with the countries of ASEAN and the Republic of Korea.
deepened its strategic relations with Australia and India
弾丸貸して、緊急なんだ
わかった
貸してなんて言ってない
?
返せばいいんだろ
こんな迷宮に入って、戦略的な偵察警戒行動ができるの?
日米同盟がしっかりしているというプレゼンス自体が抑止力となり、中国の軍部のより現実的な選択を促すことになることが期待されたが、中国は実にユニークな形で即答した
USFK Lotte
Q They are, at this point, some would say, a nuclear power. Do you accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, at least for the time being? And are you thinking about re-imposing the military exercises with South Korea, or will you keep it a freeze-for-freeze?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know, the military exercises, I gave that up quite a while ago because it costs us $100 million every time we do it. We fly these massive bombers in from Guam. And when I first started, a certain general said, “Oh, yes, sir, we fly them in from Guam. It’s right next door.” Well, right next door is seven hours away. And then they come and they drop millions of dollars of bombs, and then they go back and —
But we would spend — I mean, we spent hundreds of millions of dollars on those exercises, and I hated to see it. I thought it was unfair.
And, frankly, I was, sort of, of the opinion that South Korea should help us with that. You know, we’re protecting South Korea. I think they should help us with that.
So those exercises are very expensive. And I was telling the generals — I said: Look, you know, exercising is fun and it’s nice and they play the war games. And I’m not saying it’s not necessary, because at some levels it is, but at other levels it’s not. But it’s a very, very expensive thing. And you know, we do have to think about that too.
But when they spend hundreds of millions of dollars on those exercises and we don’t get reimbursed — we’re spending a tremendous amount of money on many countries, protecting countries that are very rich that can certainly afford to pay us and then some.
And those countries — by the way, and those countries know that it’s not right, but nobody has ever asked them before. But I’ve asked them and we’re doing — we’re gaining a lot of money. We’ve picked up over a $100 billion just in NATO over the last two years. A hundred billion dollars more has come in. And we’re doing that with a lot of countries. You’ll be seeing that a lot.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-hanoi-vietnam/
>we’re spending a tremendous amount of money on many countries, protecting countries that are very rich that can certainly afford to pay us and then some
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