2017.1.12 12:16
【外交文書】「欧州戦終了後、対日参戦に転ずる確信を持った」ソ連参戦分析、生かされず １９４５年６月、外相に報告
外務省が一般公開した外交文書のファイル
第2次大戦当時ドイツ領で、1945（昭和20）年4月にソ連の攻撃で陥落したケーニヒスベルク（現ロシア西端の飛び地・カリーニングラード）の日本総領事館職員が、同年6月1日付で東郷茂徳外相に「ソ連は欧州戦終了後、対日攻勢に転じるとの確信を持った」とする報告書を提出していたことが、12日公開の外交文書で分かった。
ソ連は同年8月、日ソ中立条約を破棄して満州に侵攻。対日参戦情報は、他にも寄せられていたとされるが日本は当時ソ連に和平交渉の仲介を要請しており、情報は生かされなかった。
報告書は（1）ソ連軍が極東に向け莫大な数の戦闘機や小型砲、軍用車を輸送している（2）対ドイツ戦用に生産した軍需品が余り、困っている（3）ソ連将校から「もし日本が満州の放棄などの要求を拒否すれば、ソ連は満州に大戦車隊で侵入するだろう」と冗談交じりに言われた-などと列記。「大東亜における勢力を拡大するため、必ずやその矛先を極東に向けると確信した」と指摘した。
©2017 The Sankei Shimbun & SANKEI DIGITAL All rights reserved.
http://www.sankei.com/world/news/170112/wor1701120027-n1.html
昭和天皇もルーズベルト＠米国も望んでなかった日米開戦のみならずソ連軍による日本人虐殺は東郷茂徳こと朴茂徳のせいだったわけで・・・（爆ｗｗｗｗｗ
ただ心は朝鮮人だった朴さんを日本を裏切ったA級売国奴といふのは間違いかもね。
彼は朝鮮人にとっては英雄でしょうから。（爆ｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗ
根本的問題は何故そんな香具師が外相なんぞしてたかですな。
そして誰が彼の後ろ盾だったか。そして何故外務省が戦後、そんな朴さんの末裔を雇ってたか？（爆ｗｗｗｗｗ
、、、（爆ｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗ
6 件のコメント:
瀬島龍三と宅見勝「てんのうはん」の守り人(鬼塚英昭著P.44-47)によれば、
1941年9月6日の「御前会議」で、対米英戦争に入る事が決定されていた様です。
10月16日の近衛内閣の総辞職、同18日の東条内閣成立時の外相は東郷重徳でしたが、
その会議の席上で、東郷重徳外相は、対米英交渉を継続せよと迫ったとあります。
むしろ、戦争をしたがっていたのは、「瀬島龍三」ではなかったかと思います。
(瀬島龍三の著書の「大東亜戦争の実相」から鬼塚氏は引用文は省略するが・・・)
瀬島のこの文章を読むと、米国と戦争するぞ、その意気込みが感じられる。彼が12月初頭の
開戦に拘った理由も書かれている。(日本が南方で米英蘭と戦い、冬の間は満州の北で露との
戦いは避けられるため。との理由を瀬島は自分の著書で書いている)
真珠湾攻撃の直前に、ルーズベルト親書が届いたが、瀬島龍三が、その親書を昭和天皇に見せ
なかった。と書いてあります。但し、それは昭和天皇の意志でもあった様です。
昭和天皇自身は、戦後、この事に関して「黙殺できたのは、不幸中の幸いであった」と述べた。
との事でありますが・・・・(?)。どうなんでしょうかネ。
https://visitpearlharbor.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/President-Roosevelts-Letter-to-Emperor-Hirohito.jpg
GHQ probed delay in FDR note to Hirohito | The Japan Times
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.../ghq-probed-delay-in-fdr-note-to-hir... -
2013/03/08 -The Emperor is said to have not received the letter until the early hours of Dec. 8, just before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.In the records, the ministry official recalls that the prosecutors seemed to have been collecting evidence to show that the foreign minister at the time, Shigenori Togo, bore responsibility for starting the war. Togo, convicted as a Class-A war criminal, was sentenced to 20 years in prison at the Tokyo war crimes tribunal. According to the document, the questioned Foreign Ministry official said the IPS apparently suspected that the Emperor’s receipt of the letter was delayed because the ministry, which had obtained a copy, was taking time to report it to the military as it prepared for war. The official denied involvement in delaying the delivery. According to the diplomatic records, dated Aug. 1, 1946, two IPS members came to the Foreign Ministry to interrogate two officials, who worked at the ministry’s telegraph bureau on the eve of the outbreak of the war. The IPS was set up on Dec. 8, 1945, at the GHQ, which ran the Allied Occupation until April 1952 to promote Japan’s democratization and demilitarization.
エタ・ハーリッヒ＝シュナイダー リヒャルト・ゾルゲ エディ東郷
世界大百科事典 第２版「東郷茂徳」の解説
とうごうしげのり【東郷茂徳】
1882‐1950(明治15‐昭和25)
外交官。鹿児島県に生まれ，東京帝国大学を卒業し，1912年外務省に入る。中国，欧米で勤務ののち欧米局長，欧亜局長を経て37年駐独大使，38年駐ソ大使となる。41年東条英機内閣の外相兼拓相に就任したが，42年大東亜省設置に反対して辞任，貴族院議員に勅選された。45年鈴木貫太郎内閣の外相兼大東亜相として太平洋戦争終結に努力した。敗戦後極東国際軍事裁判で禁固20年の判決を受け，50年7月23日アメリカ陸軍病院で病死した。
"Pretty Little Phrases": Japanese Diplomacy in 1945 | The National WWII Museum
Misguided Japanese diplomacy in 1945 helped to ensure that the war would not have a peaceful end.
August 14, 2020
Top Image: Japanese envoys in Washington, D.C., December 1941. Courtesy of the US National Archives.
Naotake Sato, a former foreign minister, served as Japan’s ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1945. In Moscow he existed beyond lethal reach by the most fanatical elements of Japan’s armed forces and thus could speak candidly. But he performed one astonishing other role: as a remorseless attorney on behalf of the US government, ruthlessly exposing the pathos and folly of Japan’s feeble diplomacy in 1945.
Sato explained his duty as he saw it: “my first responsibility [is] to prevent the harboring of illusions which are at variance with reality.” The critical illusion his cables exposed is the myth that Japan’s leaders were near to ending the war by diplomacy prior to Hiroshima. Moreover, American code breaking delivered to American leaders, starting with President Harry S. Truman, Sato’s withering cross examination of Japanese diplomacy in his cables with Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo in Tokyo.
Japan’s ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1945, Naotake Sato.
The sole Japanese diplomatic effort sanctioned by the key Japanese leadership was to secure the Soviet Union as a mediator to negotiate an end to the war. That effort ran through Sato. Decoded Japanese cables made American leaders fully aware that none of the Japanese diplomatic or military representatives in Europe who presented themselves as seeking peace on behalf of Japan carried actual sanction.
Japan’s one authorized diplomatic initiative required two things: 1) concessions that would enlist the Soviets as mediators; and 2) Japanese terms to end the war. Sato relentlessly exposed the fact that Japan never completed either of these two fundamental steps.
When Togo presented a pledge not to retain Japan’s conquests as “concessions” to secure Soviet mediation, Sato’s scathing reply was “How much effect do you expect our statements regarding the non-annexation and non-possession of territories which we have already lost or are about to lose will have on the Soviet authorities?” He added that mere “abstract statements” on concessions, which he slammed as
“pretty little phrases devoid of all connection with reality,” would have no impact on “extremely realistic” Soviet authorities.
And he then inserted the knife thrust: “If the Japanese empire is really faced with the necessity of terminating the war, we must first of all make up our minds to terminate the war.” Sato thus charged that Japan’s leaders still lacked a real intent to end the war.
Togo’s reply acknowledged that Tokyo knew securing Soviet services for a proposal to send Prince Fumimaro Konoe, a former prime minister, to Moscow for talks would be difficult. Togo affirmed that Japan would not accept anything like unconditional surrender. Konoe represented the will of the emperor and he would have “positive intentions” to “negotiate details” to set up “a cooperative relationship between Japan and Russia.” Again, Togo only offered more of the “pretty little phrases” Sato had condemned.
Sato then went for the jugular. He insisted that the crucial proof that Japan seriously sought an end to the war would be a statement of Japan’s peace terms. Togo could not provide terms because even within the tiny inner circle who authorized the Soviet initiative, there was never serious discussion, much less agreement, on actual Japanese terms to end the war. This was clear both from Togo’s inability to present such terms to Sato and confirmed in post-war interviews with key officials who admitted they never agreed on concessions to obtain Soviet mediation, much less peace terms.
Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō.
An impassioned Sato replied with his most significant message: the best hope for Japan at this point was unconditional surrender, modified only to the extent that the imperial house would be retained. Togo shot back a reply that this was wholly unacceptable. He provided not even a hint that preservation of the imperial system would be a positive step. The editors of the daily newsletter disclosing these messages to American leaders recognized the extreme importance of this exchange and made clear the import of Togo’s cable.
Buttressing the Sato-Togo exchange, Joseph C. Grew, the American deemed to possess the best insight into Japan based on his long service as ambassador to that country, assessed the weight to be accorded Konoe’s mission to Moscow. Grew supported the interpretation that the Konoe initiative was not a real effort for peace, but only a ploy to stave off defeat by playing on American war weariness. On July 27, an analysis attached to the daily summary of diplomatic intercepts for top American leaders affirmed that collectively all the intercepts—diplomatic and military read together demonstrated that Japan was nowhere near peace, but placing total faith in the great counter-invasion battle. As late as August 7, the day after Hiroshima, Grew still believed the militarists remained in firm control of Japan and thus peace was not near.
Thus, Sato’s withering cross examination by cable, not just hindsight, validates the dismissal by American leaders of Japan’s sole authentic diplomatic initiative in 1945, the totally ineffectual approach to the Soviets.
Meet the Author
Richard B. Frank is an internationally renowned expert on the Pacific war. After graduating from the University of Missouri, he was commissioned in the US Army, in which he served for nearly four years, including a tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam as an aero rifle platoon leader with the 101st Airborne Division.
Frank completed studies at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC. Soon afterwards he began research on his first book, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle, which was published in 1990 and won the US Marine Corps’ General Wallace M. Greene Award.
The Horribles: American Strategic Options Against Japan in 1945
American strategic options for ending the war against Japan in 1945 offered a choice of horrible possibilities.
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japanese-diplomacy-1945
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