どうせ見守るのなら世界中に数えきれないほどある人的ミスが無くても殺人ウンコ駄々洩れ状態のフランス製バイオラボ

2023年4月26日水曜日

ワクチン工場より人工ウイルスを作る研究施設の方が遥かに危険

https://tokumei10.blogspot.com/2023/04/blog-post_51.html

 まあ感染するワクチンも先ずはバイオラボで開発するわけで・・・

😷 Labs working to create or enhance dangerous viruses and bugs risk killing 1.6 million people each year, scientists have warned, as they called for a public review of experiments https://t.co/SbCxScVxYS

— The Telegraph (@Telegraph) April 22, 2023

 

    Labs experimenting with deadly viruses risk 1.6m deaths every year, experts warn

After fears that Covid-19 originated in a lab, virologists and biosafety experts gather in Geneva to discuss how to prevent another pandemic

By Sarah Knapton, Science Editor 22 April 2023 • 4:57pm

Labs working to create or enhance dangerous viruses and bugs risk killing 1.6 million people each year, scientists have warned, as they called for a public review of experiments.

Virologists and biosafety experts from around the world gathered in Geneva this week to discuss how to prevent lab accidents sparking a pandemic that could lead to the deaths of millions.

Recent genetic advances have made it possible to engineer viruses to make them more deadly to humans or bring back lethal strains that had been eradicated, such as the 1918 flu strain.

There are fears that Covid-19 may have leaked from a lab in China, where scientists were collecting and manipulating bat viruses to discover how they could evolve to infect humans.

‘The risk is far from acceptable’

Marc Lipsitch, professor of epidemiology at Harvard University, told delegates at the Pathogens Project Conference that he had calculated that each lab carrying out such work was putting between 10,000 and 1.6 million people at risk of death every year.

The calculation is based on fatality rates coupled with the number of accidents that occur at Biosafety Level 3 laboratories, the second most secure facilities.

At the last count, Britain had at least 600 BSL-3 labs, although it is unknown how many are experimenting on potential pandemic pathogens.

“The risk is far from acceptable,” said Prof Lipsitch. “All research that raises the potential of causing a pandemic should be reviewed.

“Scientists think if their intentions are good, they should be allowed to do anything, but it can have a gigantic impact.

“If there is a risk of a pandemic from an experiment then there should be public health benefits, not purely scientific benefits offsetting it, so we’re weighing lives against lives.”

 

Examples of risky research

Many labs have been criticised for carrying out risky research in recent years. 

Last May, Boston University created a new form of Covid-19, after inserting the spike protein from an early strain of the virus into the Omicron variant.

Imperial College carried out Covid-19 experiments in which cells were infected with both delta and omicron at the same time to see which had a competitive advantage.

Experts warned the experiment had risked combining the two variants to produce something “more lethal”, which could have infected scientists or leaked from the laboratory.

There was also widespread criticism last year when a team of Canadian and US scientists recreated the 1918 influenza virus and infected macaques with it. 

Although the team said the study had brought useful scientific revelations, experts said the same findings could have been made using sequencing without needing to create a virus.

Experts also expressed concerns about viral discovery experiments, which seek to find unknown viruses in the wild or create pathogens in the lab.

While previous lab leaks have involved known viruses such as Sars, smallpox or swine flu, new leaks could involve unknown viruses that could be more difficult to control.

Biosecurity expert Dr Filippa Lentzos of King’s College London, the conference co-director and one of the taskforce members said: “I think we agree on the need to limit risks of research.

“There seems to be some agreement that if a virus is not currently circulating in nature, then it’s much harder to justify working on it.”

Future will see more viral outbreaks 

A taskforce from The Pathogens Project will be publishing a list of recommendations in the coming months, which could include encouraging journals not to publish work that has not upheld good biosafety controls.

Co-director Jesse Bloom, a computational virologist at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center,  said: “I think we all agree there are going to be more viral outbreaks in the future. I would be shocked if there’s not another viral pandemic during my lifetime.

“Certainly, there’s probably going to be more outbreaks that involve some sort of zoonotic origin, and there are probably going to be more lab accidents in the future - maybe there will be significant lab accidents.

“Those are going to happen, and part of what we have to do is make sure we’re still doing the research to prepare for those, but we obviously want to sort of minimise the chance that research backfires.”

Experts said scientists needed to be more honest and transparent about their experiments, so the public could judge the merit of their work and whether it had the potential to place them at risk.

“We hold civil and criminal trials in public - and the people’s names and the events, those are all made public before the person is judged guilty,” added Prof Lipsitch.

“So the idea that we can’t put research in the public domain [as to] whether it raises a potential threat to humans seems a little crazy.”

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/04/22/labs-working-with-deadly-viruses-risk-16m-deaths-every-year/

The Bulletin brings top researchers to Geneva to talk biosecurity and pathogen research

By Matt Field | April 18, 2023

Whether it’s a publish-first, ask-hard-biosecurity-questions second attitude or the international proliferation of biosafety labs that study or manipulate the world’s most dangerous viruses, top virologists and other biological experts will have plenty to discuss when they meet later this week for a conference on the future of pathogen research in Geneva, Switzerland.

The Bulletin’s Pathogens Project conference includes leading scientists and researchers who will unpack, among other topics, international mechanisms for managing biological risks, the role of journalism in covering biorisks, and future threats, natural and manmade, in the biological realm. At a time when governments and non-governmental organizations are debating pathogen research and biosecurity policies, a Bulletin-organized task force has begun the process of identifying national and international policies that will improve the safety and security of pathogen research.

“Our aim is to catalyze an inclusive and broad discussion among scientists and other interested stakeholders of the risks and benefits of potential pandemic pathogen research, and how such research may be conducted in a maximally de-risked manner,” Jesse Bloom, a project co-director and professor at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center and Investigator of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, said in a Bulletin press release.

The conference, which begins Wednesday and continues Thursday, comes as the debate over how COVID-19 first infected humans, polarizing from nearly the outset, is once again heating up. So far scientific and intelligence agency inquiries into the pandemic’s origins have offered little closure on the origins question. Proponents of the so-called “lab leak” origin theory, who believe research at a lab studying bat coronaviruses in Wuhan, China, may have sparked the pandemic, argue that Chinese government stonewalling and efforts to downplay the possibility of a lab accident by Western scientists and science funders have resulted in inadequate investigation of the theory. In February, an intelligence report from the US Energy Department judged (with low confidence) that the pandemic originated in a lab, a conclusion similar to one reached earlier by the FBI. Four US intelligence agencies believe that SARS-CoV-2 first started circulating after a natural zoonotic spillover, but none of the six groups to weigh in had more than low or moderate confidence in their conclusions. Meanwhile, research published in Science last year suggested a pattern of COVID-19 spreading from a Wuhan market where susceptible animals were sold. More recently, scientists discovered raccoon dog and other animal DNA on swabs from the market that also tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, the COVID-19 virus.

Although questions about how the COVID-19 pandemic began remain unanswered, one reality is clear: Countries are building more and more labs equipped to handle work on the riskiest pandemic capable viruses at a fast clip. Last year, the Global Biolabs project, which monitors high-level pathogen labs and biorisk management policies and has a partnership with the Bulletin, identified 69 biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) labs—which handle viruses for which there is no known treatment or cure—in operation, under construction, or planned, 10 more than in 2021. Several countries that have or will have BSL-4 labs score poorly on Global Biolabs’ measures of biosecurity, biosafety, or dual-use research governance policies

In addition to lab oversight issues, the relative benefits and risks of certain pathogen research pursuits are a matter of considerable debate. Critics point to viral manipulation experiments where, say, researchers combine elements of one virus with that of another, to study the characteristics of the resulting chimera, which could have an enhanced ability to infect or sicken humans. While some researchers argue that these “gain-of-function” experiments can push medical science forward by highlighting, for example, the dangerous mutations to watch out for in natural pathogens, they also create the risks of an accident involving a novel pathogen.

Moreover, in the current state of life sciences research governance, researchers disagree over key definitions relevant to biosecurity, including what constitutes a gain-of-function experiment. In some cases, biosecurity considerations have come into play after studies are made public, rather than before

Climate change, human incursion into natural areas, and food-production processes may all be conspiring to increase the risks of pathogen spillover into humans. How to study these pathogens safety—to mitigate the impact of future disease outbreaks without creating opportunities for such outbreaks—is a topic worth talking about.

https://thebulletin.org/2023/04/the-bulletin-brings-top-researchers-to-geneva-to-talk-biosecurity-and-pathogen-research/

このご時世、バッキンガム宮殿のすぐ側でもヤバい研究やってたりするわけで・・・

Biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) labsなんてほとんどフランス製で、特に空調システムの管理とメンテとか大変なんですよねえ・・・

核開発レベルなら９９．９９９％安全でＯＫかもしれませんがキメラウイルスの場合、０．０００００００００００１％のリスクでも全類滅亡！（爆ｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗ

2023年4月25日火曜日

バイオウェポンお漏らしを隠蔽したのが米国だけとか中国だけなんてわきゃ無いでしょ。（爆ｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗ

https://tokumei10.blogspot.com/2023/04/blog-post_75.html

2023年4月15日土曜日

陰謀論　COVID-19は隠蔽された別のあるバイオ兵器流出事故対策の一環・「ウイルスファージ」として意図的に世界中に散布されたんだよ

https://tokumei10.blogspot.com/2023/04/covid-19_15.html

、、、（爆ｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗ