ウォーター・クライシス＠中国

中国より先に米国が滅ぶとかほざいてるのはシナの工作員ではなくキムチ工作員かアフォサマナ via kwout

中国経済が深刻な「ウオーター・クライシス」に直面、その影響は世界規模に―英紙
Record china
配信日時：2018年3月6日(火) 12時50分

2018年3月2日、英紙フィナンシャル・タイムズによると、中国経済が水不足、「ウオーター・クライシス」に直面している。水不足がもたらす経済的、社会的、政治的危機は人口男女比や債務膨張などの問題よりもさらに深刻だという。

国際的な基準では、国・地域で1人当たりの年間に使用可能な水資源量が1700立方メートルを下回ると「水ストレス」の状態となり、500立方メートルを下回ると「絶対的水欠乏」と見なされる。ここには歯磨きに使う水から原子力発電所に使われる水まですべてが含まれる。

記事によると、現在の中国では、1人当たりが年間に使用可能な平均水資源量は2000立方メートル。しかし、その8割は南部にあるそうだ。北部の8省が深刻な水資源不足に陥っており、さらに4省の水資源は不足しているという。しかもそれらの省は農業生産や発電、工業生産などで全国的に極めて重要な存在でもあるという。

記事によると、北京と天津、河北省は人口1億1200万人を擁するが、その水資源量は深刻な水不足の警戒ラインを大きく下回る。中国では過去25年で2万8000本の河川が消失し、地下水位も年々低下。北京の一部では地盤沈下が発生し、黄河は水量が1940年代の10分の1にまで減少。汚染問題が水不足を助長させるなどの事態も起きているという。

中国政府は南部の水資源を北部に輸送する「南水北調プロジェクト」のほか、海水の淡水化プロジェクトも進めているが、それでも根本的な改善には至っていない。同プロジェクトのすべての水資源を北京と天津、河北省に注ぎ込んだとしても同地域の水不足は改善に至らないという。また、海水の淡水化はエネルギー消費が激しく、現実的ではないそうだ。

中国政府は循環型社会への転換や汚染対策、かんがい事業、耐乾性農作物の開発などを進めているが、そのペースは遅いという。

中国の水資源不足は今後、農産物の価格や技術開発、貿易、投資、雇用、移民など、国際的にもさまざまな情勢に大きな影響を与えることが予想されると記事は伝えている。（翻訳・編集/岡田）

http://www.recordchina.co.jp/b227649-s0-c20.html

そのうち南北で内戦はじめるかもね。（爆ｗｗｗｗｗｗｗ

宗主国様の本音は海底資源より「水」（爆ｗ via kwout

世界のポリスマンが引き籠ったら有色人種の国々が水資源をめぐって際限のない殺し合いを始める via kwout

米露不在の第三次世界大戦の中心はアジア via kwout

site://tokumei10.blogspot.com 第三次世界大戦 - Google 検索 via kwout

米国さえ参戦しなければ世界が滅ぶような第三次世界大戦は起きない via kwout

要するにアメリカ・ファーストは世界を救うのですよ。世界の反米サマナの存在意義は無くなりますが。（爆ｗｗｗｗｗｗｗ


アフリカとアジアの人口を9割ぐらいワイプアウトすりゃ地球環境もちっとはマシになる。（爆ｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗｗ

China’s acute water shortage imperils economic future
China’s water crisis has no easy answers, suggesting severe dislocations to come

Charles Parton, RUSI February 27, 2018
8

The bestiary beloved of China commentators and economists needs an addition to its black swans, grey rhinos, white elephants and the ‘tigers and flies’ targeted in the corruption war. Welcome to the Camel Economy, one that must adjust very rapidly to water scarcity. A crisis looms, with potentially far more serious economic, social and political consequences than demographics, debt and deleveraging.

So why is water scarcity not a central feature of studies of China’s economic outlook? Why is it not recognised as a constraint on economic growth and thereby China’s power? After all, in 2005 the Minister of Water Resources declared a need “to fight for every drop of water or die, that is the challenge facing China”, while former premier Wen Jiabao said that water shortages threatened “the very survival of the Chinese nation”.

Is it really that bad? Unfortunately, it is. Accepted definitions of water stress, scarcity and acute scarcity are resources of 1,700 cubic meters, 1,000 cubic meters and 500 cubic meters per person per year, covering everything from nuclear power stations to teeth cleaning. China’s overall resources are roughly 2,000 cubic meters, but 80 per cent of water resources are in the south. In the north, eight provinces suffer from acute water scarcity, a further four from scarcity. They account for 38 per cent of China’ agriculture, 50 per cent of its power generation, 46 per cent of its industry and 41 per cent of its population.


Here are a few more scary statistics for economists to consider. The water resources of the 112m population of the Beijing/Tianjin/Hebei region, equate to half of acute scarcity. In the past 25 years, 28,000 rivers have disappeared. Groundwater has fallen by up to 1-3 metres a year. One consequence: parts of Beijing are subsiding by 11cm a year. The flow of the Yellow River, water supply to millions, is a tenth of what it was in the 1940s; it often fails to reach the sea. Pollution further curtails supply: in 2017 8.8 per cent of water was unfit even for agricultural or industrial use.

The consequences of scarcity are all too human. In Lintao city residents in high rise buildings must carry water up to their apartments. In Taiyuan, capital of Shanxi province (population 35m), the 2,500-year-old famed vinegar industry is under threat, while at the main international hotel last year guests were advised that water for washing was available for one hour a day. Zhengzhou’s projected population increase of 3m-4m by 2020 may be unrealisable: there is water for only one of seven new purifying plants.

The political challenge is immense: China’s Five Year Plan implies halving per capita water consumption while doubling China’s 2010 GDP.

“Don’t worry,’ say economists, “China has the South North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP). They can shift water. Or desalinate it.” Alas, not in sufficient quantities. Even if all the water of the SNWTP went to the Beijing/Tianjin/Hebei region, it would still leave its population suffering acute water scarcity. But it must also supply three other provinces. Transfers from Tibet or Russia are fantasy. Desalination is dotty: it is very power-consuming and power generation (still largely coal) consumes much water.

The Chinese government is moving too slowly towards the Camel Economy. It has plans, incentives for officials; it invests in recycling, irrigation, pollution, drought resistant crops; it leads the world in high voltage transmission (to get hydro, wind and solar energy from the west of China). None of this is sufficient or likely to be in time. The most effective measures are the most difficult politically: raising the price of water from around a quarter of the world’s average, ensuring better governance (too many ministries are involved in decisions, vested interests interfere), abandoning a policy of self-sufficiency in food, moving away from power consuming industries (steel and aluminium). It is easier to kick the watering can down the road.

Yet a Camel Economy is what China has said it wants: high tech manufacturing, service based, rebalanced towards consumption (current water pricing/subsidies favour industry over consumers), an efficient agriculture sector (highly important, since agriculture currently uses 62 per cent of water resources).

There are global implications: price increases for agricultural products; investment or co-operation with companies that develop water saving technology; wider science and technology co-operation; relocation of water consuming industries outside China. Less positively, failure to achieve a Camel Economy would greatly affect world trade, investment and employment; in the worst case, legal and illegal migration levels could rise, as would tensions over transboundary water.

Perhaps the biggest implication is for China’s global ambitions, which require a powerful and sustainable economy. Economists might want to ask themselves whether water scarcity will put paid to those ambitions. You can print money, but you can’t print water.

Charles Parton is Associate fellow of RUSI, trustee of the environmental NGO China Dialogue, and London Director of the Beijing-based research and analysis company China Policy.
https://www.ft.com/content/3ee05452-1801-11e8-9376-4a6390addb44